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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
-vs-
RUSSELL E. ROOT, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 870142-CA 
5fr2--
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the judgement of the Eighth Circuit Court 
in and for Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Joseph I. Dimmick, Circuit Court judge. 
MILTON T. HARMON 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 97 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (801) 623-1802 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
DONALD J. EYRE, JR. 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (801) 623-1141 
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ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION 
Priority classification is priority number two. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
jurisdictional authority is conferred* upon the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(c) 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ISSUE ONE: The Trial Court erred in considering hear-
say evidence. 
ISSUE TWO: The Trial Court erred in interpreting and 
applying the Utah Fish and Game violation 
law, and finding guilt where no mens rea 
was present. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged with violation of 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, Section 23-20-4, possession 
of illegally taking protected wildlife. Trial was held 
before the Court, without a jury, and the Defendant was 
convicted of the charge, and thereafter sentenced. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 28th, 1986, the Defendant was contacted 
by Law Enforcement Officers, including Juab County 
Deputy Sheriff, LuWayne Walker. The Defendant and his 
brother were then riding in a pickup truck, and in the 
bed of the truck was a doe deer, which had its throat 
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cut, and had been shot through the neck with a large 
caliber rifle. The Defendant and his brother each had 
Utah deer hunting licenses, it was the hunting season, 
however, the doe deer was a protected wildlife, and 
taking was not authorized by the hunting license 
possessed by the Defendant. 
Deputy Walker testified that he was investigating 
a possible wildlife violation. A lady had called the 
Juab County Sheriff's Office earlier in the day, 
indicating that two men driving a pickup truck had shot 
a doe deer. (T-4) 
The Officer testified that early in the evening, 
as he was waiting at the bottom of a mountain road, in 
the area where the Defendant was contacted, that he 
looked toward the mountains, and could see the lights 
of a vehicle coming down the mountain. That these 
lights were shut off at least one as he observed the 
vehicles descent. (T-12) 
In addition to finding the doe deer in the back of 
the truck in which Defendant was riding, there was also 
found a knife with blood on it, and a coat with blood 
on it. There was no indication that this was fresh 
blood however. And no gun, of any caliber, was found in 
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the truck. (T-6) 
As the Defendant was contacted by the Officers he 
advised them that as he was coming down the mountain, 
saw the doe deer laying to the side of the road. 
Stopped the truck, inspected the deer, saw that it had 
been shot and was dead, and determined to take the deer 
to town and deliver it to the appropriate Officers for 
disposition. (T-16, T-32) The deer was loaded into the 
truck, and the Defendant proceeded to the area where he 
saw the officers, stopped his truck and proceeded to 
contact the Officers for disposition of the deer. 
At Trial, Defendants' mother testified that she 
recognized the knife and coat found in her sons 
possession by the Officers. That the coat was hers, the 
knife was her husbands, that she and her husband had 
been hunting deer a few days prior to her sons arrest, 
that they had shot a deer and cut its throat, had 
cleaned the deer, and that is how the blood was placed 
upon these items. (T-26) 
In finding the Defendants guilt, the judge 
indicated that he need not consider the hearsay 
evidence regarding the report of the lady to the 
Officers that she had seen two men shoot a doe deer 
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earlier in the day. But that mere possession of the 
deer, inspite of Defendant's explanation, was 
sufficient for conviction. (T-38) And conviction was 
had without any proof Defendant shot the deer or 
illegally took the deer, but merely that he was in 
possession. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial judge has improperly considered 
hearsay evidence in arriving at his decision that the 
Defendant was guilty. 
II. Mens rea is an element of the crime of 
possession of illegally taken protected wildlife, and 
must be proven prior to a finding of guilty can be 
entered• 
ARGUMENT 
In finding the Defendant guilty, without any 
showing of illegal taking of the deer, or any guilty 
intent, the judge has had to rely upon some proof. 
There was the possession of the deer, but Defendant 
gave a reasonable explanation of that possession, which 
explanation was consistent w^th t;he existing 
circumstances, i.e., no gun, only a knife with dried 
blood upon it, vehicle seen stopping by the side of the 
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road in the area where the deer was found. Consequently 
one is lead to believe that the Trial Judge did 
consider the hearsay testimony of a telephone incident 
report to the County Sheriff. 
Of course the Court explained that mere possession 
was sufficient for conviction, and no proof of illegal 
taking was necessary. But here, the Court erred. The 
law says that the possession must be of illegally taken 
wildlife. Section 23-20-4, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, is 
clear on this point. And the illegal taking must be 
interpreted in light of the requirements of criminal 
responsibility contained in Section 76-2-101, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, specifying the need of showing the 
required guilty mind prior to the finding of guilt. 
Perhaps this is a policy issue* That is, imposing 
the requirement that a guilty mental state must be 
found prior to conviction of the crime here charged, 
rather than relying on mere possession. But policy is 
in favor of such a requirement. The State relys on the 
good conduct and cooperation of its citizens in 
enforcing its laws, and without such cooperation law 
enforcement would be next to impossible. To hold a 
person guilty of the offense charged, when that person 
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is in the act of assisting law enforcement, as the 
Defendant in this case who is bringing in a deer found 
to the side of the road, contradicts not only sound 
principles of law, but sound reason in having citizen 
participation in law enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
The conviction of the Defendant should be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted this J^/0 day of July, 
1987. 
^ £ S ^ 21 
MILTON/T. tfARMON 
Attorney for, Defendant-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Copies of the following Sections of Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended: 
Section 23-20-4 
Section 76-2-101 
23-20-4. Possession of illegally taken protected 
wildlife unlawful * Seizure - Possession as 
evidence of guilt - Taking or possession of big 
game, endangered wildlife, etc., a class A 
misdemeanor - Other illegal taking or possession 
a class B misdemeanor. 
Possession of illegally taken protected wildlife is 
unlawful; and all protected wildlife, or parts of 
them, taken, held, shipped, or consigned for ship-
ment, may be seized by the division of wildlife res-
ources. Possession of any protected wildlife, or any 
parts of them, taken during the time or period 
within which the taking or possession of same is 
prohibited, shall be prima facie evidence of guilt. 
Any person who has taken or has in his posses-
sion any species of big game, bear, cougar, or rare, 
threatened or endangered wildlife which have been 
illegally taken, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Any person who has any other wildlife illegally 
taken or ppssessed is guilty of a class B misdeme-
anor. 1979 
76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct and 
criminal responsibly. 
No person is guilty of an offense unless hit 
conduct is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, 
with criminal negligence, or with a mental state 
otherwise specified in the statute defining the 
offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict 
liability. 
These standards of criminal responsibility shall 
not apply to the violations set forth in Title 41, 
Chapter 6, unless specifically provided by law. 1M3 
